In just a few weeks, the movie adaptation of Dan Brown's bestseller The DaVinci Code will hit the silver screeen. How should Christians respond to this? Should we take notice? Should we see the movie? Should we protest? Should we rant and rave about one more attack on Christians in the culture war?
I suggest that we not rant and rave or protest per se. I do suggest that we see the movie, perhaps even read the book. For one thing, judged purely as a work of literature, it is a descent novel (and I trust an exciting movie). It is not Tolstoy or Hemingway, but it is a page-turner and a good piece of escapist fiction--I know, I've read the book and thoroughly enjoyed it--accept when the author made me mad with some of his absurd claims about church history. For another thing, if we are going to criticize something, we need to know what we're criticizing (and btw the book contains no gratuitous or explicit sex or violence). Finally, I think the release of this movie can allow Christians an opportunity to speak the truth in love to our neighbors, many of whom will be deceived and misled by the erroneous historical claims made by Brown.
So why not see the movie, read and study some of the Christian reviews and critiques of the book, and then deliberately set out to engage your friends and neighbors in a loving, but hopefully fruitful dialogue about the real Jesus who is God in the flesh, who died on the cross to save us from our sins.
Mar 2, 2006
Sovereignty and Free Will Revisited
Cedar of lebanon asked some good questions about an earlier blog post on the relationship between God's sovereignty and human freedom. His post and my response are somewhat lengthy, so I enter it here as a new post...
cedar of lebanon said...
I was having trouble with this argument and one of the problems I thought I saw was that the two options, Job A or Job B, did not seem to be a true moral choice where there is clearly right and wrong.
My first gut reaction at this point is to say that you may have missed the point of my argument. The whole point was that if a person makes a choice (a moral one or not) without a sufficient reason for that choice, then he is acting arbitrarily and irrationally-- a mark typically seen with people and actions which we deem non-morally culpable. The conclusion being that libertarianism suggests that agents are not morally responsible for their actions. Anyway, let's see where you go with this...
To promote thought regarding this I have re-written the discussion, but replaced the character and the choices with something more familiar.
Suppose there is a person named Joseph, who is trying to decide between two options. Let us label the first option "sleep with Potaphar’s wife" and the second option "run." And let us suppose that there are reasons in favor of Joseph choosing to sleep with her, and other reasons in favor of Joseph choosing to run. The former we will call RA and the latter RB. Now RA may include such factors as the desire for pleasure, a feeling of power and importance, and so on. But, other equally significant factors support running, so that RB includes the fact the God would be pleased if he ran, he would not betray Potiphar, and so on.
Now suppose that Joseph finally decides to accept the offer to sleep with her. We need to ask the question, then, "Why did Joseph choose this option?" The libertarian, being an indeterminist, cannot say that the reasons Joseph had for this option—RA—compelled or determined that Joseph choose that option. Joseph, being free, could have done otherwise. But, I want to suggest that if Joseph had free will when he choose to sleep with her, then his actions were random and arbitrary in such a way that he could not possibly be morally responsible for choosing to do this.The libertarian, of course, will cry foul at this point. "How can Joseph’s choice be arbitrary since he had some reasons—RA—for choosing it?"
Well, I can agree that RA can be meaningfully cited as reasons for why Joseph chose to sleep with her, but I submit that the libertarian has answered the wrong question. The salient question is not, "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her?", but "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her rather than run?" I do not think that the libertarian can answer this question satisfactorily.In fact, I believe that the libertarian indeterminist is caught on the horns of a dilemma: The question is, "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her rather than run?" Either there is an answer to this question or there is not. If there is an answer, then Joseph's choice is determined (and indeterminism is false). If there is no answer, then Joseph's choice is made arbitrarily. So, if indeterminism is true, then Joseph's choice is a random choice, and his moral responsibility for that choice is vitiated. Let me present this dilemma a bit more formally:
(1) Either there is a causally sufficient reason why Joseph chose to sleep with her rather than run, or there is not.
(2) If there is a causally sufficient reason why, then Joseph's choice is determined.
(3) If there is no causally sufficient reason why, then Joseph's choice is arbitrary.
In defense of (3), let us imagine three different scenarios regarding the relative weight of the reasons Joseph may have with respect to the two options. First, suppose that Joseph's reasons for choosing either option are equally weighted. That is, let it be the case that RA provides no motivation to prefer sleeping with her to running, and vice versa. If so, then it seems that there is no reason why Joseph chose sleeping with her rather than running, even though he did have the considerations of RA in favor of sleeping with her. Would not his choice to sleep with her rather than run be just as arbitrary as if he had no reasons for choosing either option (i.e., if both RA and RB did not exist)? So it seems. So, how does adding equally weighted reasons for the respective options diminish the arbitrariness of the choice in such a way as to ground Joseph's moral responsibility?
The difficulty does not go away if we assume that RA and RB are not equally weighted. Suppose that RA makes the choice of sleeping with her more preferable, so preferable in fact that it would be clearly irrational to choose to run. The indeterminist/libertarian would still maintain that there is no causally sufficient reason why Joseph chooses to sleep with her (if in fact he does choose to sleep with her). Joseph is perfectly capable of choosing to run in this situation. But, the compatibilist can reply that moral responsibility would come down, on this view, to having the ability to make an irrational choice. And who would want such an ability?
But, what if RA is weightier than RB, but not by a great margin? That is, would our assessment of Joseph's moral responsibility be any different if he had some reason to prefer sleeping with her to runing, yet that reason was not so overwhelmingly preferable that running instead would seem obviously crazy? I don't think so. It would still turn out to be irrational to choose to run if Joseph could not say anything in explanation of his choice.
To see this, imagine two possible worlds, W1 and W2, that both contain our character Joseph. And let us assume that in both worlds he has some small preference for sleeping with Potaphar’s wife as opposed to running (but not a very strong preference). Now suppose also that in both worlds Joseph opts for running (the less preferable choice). Intuitively, is seems possible for such a choice to be made, and we would not, in ordinary situations, immediately charge someone who made such a choice with irrationality. Let us suppose, for example, that in W1 Joseph, if asked why he chose to run rather than sleep with her, would reply, "I just had a gut feeling about sleeping with her." We would be prone, I think, to accept this answer and not consider Joseph irrational because acting on a gut feeling is often the appropriate thing to do and does in fact constitute a reason for Joseph to really prefer running after all. It's the presence of this reason that explains why we are willing to give Joseph's rationality (in W1) the benefit of the doubt.
However, suppose that things are slightly different with respect to Joseph in W2. Suppose that he had no gut feelings about running that influenced him to choose it in spite of adultery’s apparent preferability. We ask, "So even though adultery seemed more preferable on purely rational grounds, you chose to run because it appealed to you in some unspecifiable way?" Joseph replies, "No, sleeping with her appealed to me more. I just picked running. No reason." It would be safe to conclude that Joseph is irrational. He quite arbitrarily chose to run rather than commit adultery against clear reasons for the latter, and he did so for absolutely no reason. Hence, it would seem that the indeterminist wants us to ground responsibility in the ability to act irrationally. But, I submit that there is no reason that we should go along with this. When people act irrationally and arbitrarily, we tend to think that they are defective in some way—in a way that causes us to mitigate their moral responsibility. So, it would seem that libertarian free will is actually inconsistent with moral responsibility.
What do I conclude from all this? When confronted with the apparent problem of reconciling God’s sovereignty and free will, there is no reason to follow the Arminian in opting for free will and rejecting divine sovereignty, nor is there any need to paradoxically hold these concepts in tension. Because the only motivation for holding on to free will—the need to preserve moral responsibility—has no force. Moral responsibility does not require free will, and thus there is no reason, no motive, to diminish God’s sovereignty.
+++ I believe there are difficulties with this argument. Please comment. Thank you. cs +++
Well, cs, after reading your revision of the argument, substituting the Joseph story for my Smith's job-offer story, I honestly can't see any relevant differences that would cause me to change my view or revise my assessment of the story's significance. If Joseph chooses the less preferable option (preferable from his own perspective, mind you) for absolutely no reason, then Joseph is acting irrationally--irrationally in such a way as to make us think that there is something wrong with him. He makes the less preferable choice as sort of a "glitch" in his will--a choice that is very hard to even describe as a real choice rather than as an accident, something that happens to him, rather than something he does. If I actually met this "Joseph" character, and he told me that he literally made the "choice" for no reason, I would have to conclude either (1) he is lying (perhaps to himself as well as me) and he really does have a reason for his choice after all, or (2) he is sick or mentally defective--in which case he is not morally responsible.
If you think my assessment is mistaken, I'd be glad to entertain any critical remarks you might have.
cedar of lebanon said...
I was having trouble with this argument and one of the problems I thought I saw was that the two options, Job A or Job B, did not seem to be a true moral choice where there is clearly right and wrong.
My first gut reaction at this point is to say that you may have missed the point of my argument. The whole point was that if a person makes a choice (a moral one or not) without a sufficient reason for that choice, then he is acting arbitrarily and irrationally-- a mark typically seen with people and actions which we deem non-morally culpable. The conclusion being that libertarianism suggests that agents are not morally responsible for their actions. Anyway, let's see where you go with this...
To promote thought regarding this I have re-written the discussion, but replaced the character and the choices with something more familiar.
Suppose there is a person named Joseph, who is trying to decide between two options. Let us label the first option "sleep with Potaphar’s wife" and the second option "run." And let us suppose that there are reasons in favor of Joseph choosing to sleep with her, and other reasons in favor of Joseph choosing to run. The former we will call RA and the latter RB. Now RA may include such factors as the desire for pleasure, a feeling of power and importance, and so on. But, other equally significant factors support running, so that RB includes the fact the God would be pleased if he ran, he would not betray Potiphar, and so on.
Now suppose that Joseph finally decides to accept the offer to sleep with her. We need to ask the question, then, "Why did Joseph choose this option?" The libertarian, being an indeterminist, cannot say that the reasons Joseph had for this option—RA—compelled or determined that Joseph choose that option. Joseph, being free, could have done otherwise. But, I want to suggest that if Joseph had free will when he choose to sleep with her, then his actions were random and arbitrary in such a way that he could not possibly be morally responsible for choosing to do this.The libertarian, of course, will cry foul at this point. "How can Joseph’s choice be arbitrary since he had some reasons—RA—for choosing it?"
Well, I can agree that RA can be meaningfully cited as reasons for why Joseph chose to sleep with her, but I submit that the libertarian has answered the wrong question. The salient question is not, "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her?", but "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her rather than run?" I do not think that the libertarian can answer this question satisfactorily.In fact, I believe that the libertarian indeterminist is caught on the horns of a dilemma: The question is, "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her rather than run?" Either there is an answer to this question or there is not. If there is an answer, then Joseph's choice is determined (and indeterminism is false). If there is no answer, then Joseph's choice is made arbitrarily. So, if indeterminism is true, then Joseph's choice is a random choice, and his moral responsibility for that choice is vitiated. Let me present this dilemma a bit more formally:
(1) Either there is a causally sufficient reason why Joseph chose to sleep with her rather than run, or there is not.
(2) If there is a causally sufficient reason why, then Joseph's choice is determined.
(3) If there is no causally sufficient reason why, then Joseph's choice is arbitrary.
In defense of (3), let us imagine three different scenarios regarding the relative weight of the reasons Joseph may have with respect to the two options. First, suppose that Joseph's reasons for choosing either option are equally weighted. That is, let it be the case that RA provides no motivation to prefer sleeping with her to running, and vice versa. If so, then it seems that there is no reason why Joseph chose sleeping with her rather than running, even though he did have the considerations of RA in favor of sleeping with her. Would not his choice to sleep with her rather than run be just as arbitrary as if he had no reasons for choosing either option (i.e., if both RA and RB did not exist)? So it seems. So, how does adding equally weighted reasons for the respective options diminish the arbitrariness of the choice in such a way as to ground Joseph's moral responsibility?
The difficulty does not go away if we assume that RA and RB are not equally weighted. Suppose that RA makes the choice of sleeping with her more preferable, so preferable in fact that it would be clearly irrational to choose to run. The indeterminist/libertarian would still maintain that there is no causally sufficient reason why Joseph chooses to sleep with her (if in fact he does choose to sleep with her). Joseph is perfectly capable of choosing to run in this situation. But, the compatibilist can reply that moral responsibility would come down, on this view, to having the ability to make an irrational choice. And who would want such an ability?
But, what if RA is weightier than RB, but not by a great margin? That is, would our assessment of Joseph's moral responsibility be any different if he had some reason to prefer sleeping with her to runing, yet that reason was not so overwhelmingly preferable that running instead would seem obviously crazy? I don't think so. It would still turn out to be irrational to choose to run if Joseph could not say anything in explanation of his choice.
To see this, imagine two possible worlds, W1 and W2, that both contain our character Joseph. And let us assume that in both worlds he has some small preference for sleeping with Potaphar’s wife as opposed to running (but not a very strong preference). Now suppose also that in both worlds Joseph opts for running (the less preferable choice). Intuitively, is seems possible for such a choice to be made, and we would not, in ordinary situations, immediately charge someone who made such a choice with irrationality. Let us suppose, for example, that in W1 Joseph, if asked why he chose to run rather than sleep with her, would reply, "I just had a gut feeling about sleeping with her." We would be prone, I think, to accept this answer and not consider Joseph irrational because acting on a gut feeling is often the appropriate thing to do and does in fact constitute a reason for Joseph to really prefer running after all. It's the presence of this reason that explains why we are willing to give Joseph's rationality (in W1) the benefit of the doubt.
However, suppose that things are slightly different with respect to Joseph in W2. Suppose that he had no gut feelings about running that influenced him to choose it in spite of adultery’s apparent preferability. We ask, "So even though adultery seemed more preferable on purely rational grounds, you chose to run because it appealed to you in some unspecifiable way?" Joseph replies, "No, sleeping with her appealed to me more. I just picked running. No reason." It would be safe to conclude that Joseph is irrational. He quite arbitrarily chose to run rather than commit adultery against clear reasons for the latter, and he did so for absolutely no reason. Hence, it would seem that the indeterminist wants us to ground responsibility in the ability to act irrationally. But, I submit that there is no reason that we should go along with this. When people act irrationally and arbitrarily, we tend to think that they are defective in some way—in a way that causes us to mitigate their moral responsibility. So, it would seem that libertarian free will is actually inconsistent with moral responsibility.
What do I conclude from all this? When confronted with the apparent problem of reconciling God’s sovereignty and free will, there is no reason to follow the Arminian in opting for free will and rejecting divine sovereignty, nor is there any need to paradoxically hold these concepts in tension. Because the only motivation for holding on to free will—the need to preserve moral responsibility—has no force. Moral responsibility does not require free will, and thus there is no reason, no motive, to diminish God’s sovereignty.
+++ I believe there are difficulties with this argument. Please comment. Thank you. cs +++
Well, cs, after reading your revision of the argument, substituting the Joseph story for my Smith's job-offer story, I honestly can't see any relevant differences that would cause me to change my view or revise my assessment of the story's significance. If Joseph chooses the less preferable option (preferable from his own perspective, mind you) for absolutely no reason, then Joseph is acting irrationally--irrationally in such a way as to make us think that there is something wrong with him. He makes the less preferable choice as sort of a "glitch" in his will--a choice that is very hard to even describe as a real choice rather than as an accident, something that happens to him, rather than something he does. If I actually met this "Joseph" character, and he told me that he literally made the "choice" for no reason, I would have to conclude either (1) he is lying (perhaps to himself as well as me) and he really does have a reason for his choice after all, or (2) he is sick or mentally defective--in which case he is not morally responsible.
If you think my assessment is mistaken, I'd be glad to entertain any critical remarks you might have.
Feb 3, 2006
Alabama Churches Set Ablaze!
I awoke early this morning to the news that six churches in rural Alabama (Bibb and Chilton counties) had been damaged by fire during the night. At least two of the churches were burned to the ground. Though investigators have not yet said so, this is undoubtedly the work of arsonists.
Race does not appear to be a factor since the churches set ablaze represented both black and white congregations. This suggests that the motive of the arsonist(s) could have been religious or perhaps political. Of course, it could have simply been the misdeeds of some nihilistic teenage pranksters with too much time on their hands. But, in our cultural climate, with more and more antagonism being aimed at conservative Christians in the so-called "culture war," my money is on the hypothesis that the arsonist was someone with a chip on his shoulder, someone who has come to dispise evangelical Christians or "organized religion."
Whoever it was, let us pray that the police catch him (or them) soon, before they can do this again.
Race does not appear to be a factor since the churches set ablaze represented both black and white congregations. This suggests that the motive of the arsonist(s) could have been religious or perhaps political. Of course, it could have simply been the misdeeds of some nihilistic teenage pranksters with too much time on their hands. But, in our cultural climate, with more and more antagonism being aimed at conservative Christians in the so-called "culture war," my money is on the hypothesis that the arsonist was someone with a chip on his shoulder, someone who has come to dispise evangelical Christians or "organized religion."
Whoever it was, let us pray that the police catch him (or them) soon, before they can do this again.
Jan 17, 2006
We Need Judge Alito Now!
Once again, an activist, liberal-leaning, life-hating Supreme Court has made the wrong ruling! Today, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled to uphold the Oregon law that permits physician-assisted suicide. Both Justices O'Conner and Kennedy, purported to be conservatives, sided with majority to perpetuate the culture of death that has prevailed in that state for several years now.
This decision, of course, is just part of the trend that Americans have had to live with for many years--the trend to move our society further and further away from commonsense moral values and a respect for the sanctity of human life. In 1973, they legalized abortion on demand. A couple of years ago, the court struck down all the nation's anti-sodomy laws, paving the way for the possibility of same-sex marriage down the road. A few months ago, they undermined one of our most basic liberties, the right to private property, by allowing cities to use the concept of public domain to take people's homes and sell them to private corporations to enhance the local economy. In many of the more recent cases, Justice O'Conner has been the deciding vote in very close 5-4 decisions by the court.
Fortunately, she is about to retire. And, Lord willing, Judge Samuel Alito will take her place and swing the balance of the court back in the direction of sanity. We need him and others like him on the Supreme Court now! He and Judge Roberts are long overdue!
The one good thing that came out of the court's decision today is that we all got to see Judge Robert's true colors--he joined Scalia and Thomas in desenting from the court's life-hating decision to allow Oregon doctors to continue killing human beings.
This decision, of course, is just part of the trend that Americans have had to live with for many years--the trend to move our society further and further away from commonsense moral values and a respect for the sanctity of human life. In 1973, they legalized abortion on demand. A couple of years ago, the court struck down all the nation's anti-sodomy laws, paving the way for the possibility of same-sex marriage down the road. A few months ago, they undermined one of our most basic liberties, the right to private property, by allowing cities to use the concept of public domain to take people's homes and sell them to private corporations to enhance the local economy. In many of the more recent cases, Justice O'Conner has been the deciding vote in very close 5-4 decisions by the court.
Fortunately, she is about to retire. And, Lord willing, Judge Samuel Alito will take her place and swing the balance of the court back in the direction of sanity. We need him and others like him on the Supreme Court now! He and Judge Roberts are long overdue!
The one good thing that came out of the court's decision today is that we all got to see Judge Robert's true colors--he joined Scalia and Thomas in desenting from the court's life-hating decision to allow Oregon doctors to continue killing human beings.
Jan 3, 2006
Do You Know How to Interpret the Bible?
Everyone has an opinion of what particular passages of Scripture mean. Too often I hear things like "That's just your interpretation" or "This text means to me. . ."--as if there is no right interpretation of biblical texts and as if any interpretation is as good as another.
However, nothing could be further from the truth. Any biblical text means what its original author intended it to mean, nothing more, nothing less. What's more, we can learn that meaning if we are willing to work hard at it. There is a science of interpreting books, including the Bible. That science is called "hermeneutics." Those who sudy biblical hermeneutics learn the appropriate rules and procedures for interpreting the Bible so that they can give intelligent, informed answers when people ask them about the meaning of a passage of Scripture.
The first 2006 issue of ARC's magazine Areopagus Journal will be about hermeneutics. If you care about "rightly dividing the Word of God", then I strongly encourage you to purchase that issue and get a crash course in biblical interpretation. You can order it at:
www.arcapologetics.org
However, nothing could be further from the truth. Any biblical text means what its original author intended it to mean, nothing more, nothing less. What's more, we can learn that meaning if we are willing to work hard at it. There is a science of interpreting books, including the Bible. That science is called "hermeneutics." Those who sudy biblical hermeneutics learn the appropriate rules and procedures for interpreting the Bible so that they can give intelligent, informed answers when people ask them about the meaning of a passage of Scripture.
The first 2006 issue of ARC's magazine Areopagus Journal will be about hermeneutics. If you care about "rightly dividing the Word of God", then I strongly encourage you to purchase that issue and get a crash course in biblical interpretation. You can order it at:
www.arcapologetics.org
Debate on Intelligent Design
New Orleans Seminary is hosting a debate on Intelligent Design theory to be held in Marietta, Georgia at Johnson Ferry Road Baptist Church on Feb. 3-4, 2006.
The two main speakers are William Dembski, one of the premier defenders of ID, and Michael Ruse, a prominent critic of ID. Other participants include William Lane Craig, Frank Beckwith, Martin Hewlett, and Wesley Elsberry. Make plans to attend this important event.
The two main speakers are William Dembski, one of the premier defenders of ID, and Michael Ruse, a prominent critic of ID. Other participants include William Lane Craig, Frank Beckwith, Martin Hewlett, and Wesley Elsberry. Make plans to attend this important event.
Dec 20, 2005
A Third Option in Church/State Relations
No doubt you have noticed that around Christmas time the perennial debate over the relationship between church and state tends to heat up. Christians want to put up their Nativity scenes at the courthouse and the secularists want to stop them. Then the discussion goes round and round over the intent of the Founding fathers in the constitution's statements about religion and whether allowing a place for religious expression in the public square is tantamount to a government endorsement of religion.
The debate, it seems to me, is always polarized between two extremes, both of which were clearly seen in the recent Fox News Special on "Religion in America." On the one hand are the Separationists who believe that religion has no place whatsoever in the public square and that the government should keep religious expressions out of public facilities and meetings completely. On the other hand are the Majoritarians who believe that "majority rules" and that whatever religion happens to be in the majority should have access to the public square and a priviledge position in the culture at large. Majoritarians rightly think that separationism violates their right to the free exercise of religion. However, a case can be made that the majoritarian view really is tantamount to a government establish of religion. And so there is always the inevitble stand-off.
However, this stand-off could be greatly alleviated if both sides relaized that there is a third alternative. its an alternative that has traditionally been defended by Baptists, by the way--but most Baptists today have forgotten it. It is called Accommodationism. This is the view that the government should, as far as is practically possible, accommodate (not endorse) the free exercise of religion. In other words, to use just one example, the government should not set up Nativity scenes at the courthouse nor pay to have it done, but it should make public space available to private citizens to do so if they like. They should also make such space available to the Jews, Muslims, and atheists. The government should say to everyone, regardless of their religious views, "Ya'll come!"
Accommodationism provides for a free market of ideas. No one's rights are violated, and the government isn't establishing or endorsing any faith. This, it seems to me, is much closer to what our founding fathers intended.
The debate, it seems to me, is always polarized between two extremes, both of which were clearly seen in the recent Fox News Special on "Religion in America." On the one hand are the Separationists who believe that religion has no place whatsoever in the public square and that the government should keep religious expressions out of public facilities and meetings completely. On the other hand are the Majoritarians who believe that "majority rules" and that whatever religion happens to be in the majority should have access to the public square and a priviledge position in the culture at large. Majoritarians rightly think that separationism violates their right to the free exercise of religion. However, a case can be made that the majoritarian view really is tantamount to a government establish of religion. And so there is always the inevitble stand-off.
However, this stand-off could be greatly alleviated if both sides relaized that there is a third alternative. its an alternative that has traditionally been defended by Baptists, by the way--but most Baptists today have forgotten it. It is called Accommodationism. This is the view that the government should, as far as is practically possible, accommodate (not endorse) the free exercise of religion. In other words, to use just one example, the government should not set up Nativity scenes at the courthouse nor pay to have it done, but it should make public space available to private citizens to do so if they like. They should also make such space available to the Jews, Muslims, and atheists. The government should say to everyone, regardless of their religious views, "Ya'll come!"
Accommodationism provides for a free market of ideas. No one's rights are violated, and the government isn't establishing or endorsing any faith. This, it seems to me, is much closer to what our founding fathers intended.
Nov 21, 2005
Preventing Dumbness: The Role of Philosophy in the Academy, the Pulpit, and the Pew - Part 3
In the Pew
By speaking of the role of philosophy "in the pew," I mean to refer to the role of philosophy in the life of the average Christian believer as he seeks to live his life before the face of God each day and provide salt and light to the culture in which he lives. Much of what I have said above is applicable to the average believer. Apologetics and logic, especially, are disciplines that each and every Christian ought to spend some time studying in order to fulfill the obligations enjoined on him by the Great Commission (Matt. 2:19-20) and First Peter 3:15.
Beyond these, however, let me add a couple of more roles that philosophy can play in the life of the Christian in the pew. First, insofar as philosophy deals with the history of ideas and with the most basic questions that people ask—"What is real?", "How do we know?", "What is right and what is wrong?", "What is beautiful?""—it can help the Christian be a well-rounded, culturally literate citizen who can make a meaningful contribution to the well-being of his society. Unless you think that evangelism is the only reason Christians have been left in the world, then you will agree that we have a contribution to make to culture as culture, to society as society; that we have a responsibility to our fellow citizens to participate in establishing sound public policy, to make and support good art and good music, etc. Philosophy, through the study of the history of ideas and through philosophical analysis of ideas, can enable Christians to be responsibly engaged in these and every other aspect of human society, avoiding the mistakes of the past as well as the present. In line with my earlier discussion of "faith seeking understanding," philosophical study can also help the Christian inject Christian principles and values into the various spheres of culture, drawing out, for example, the implications of the Christian worldview for politics, education, art, and science.
Second, and closely related to the first point, philosophy can strengthen the Christian’s ability to discern truth from error. The Word of God tells us to "test the spirits" (1 John 4:1) and to avoid being "carried about by every wind of doctrine" (Eph. 4:14). The study of God’s Word is basic to this task, of course. But, I have pointed out that understanding and applying the Bible and formulating sound doctrine from the Scriptures is enhanced by theology’s handmaid, philosophy. Think, for example, of how many Christians have been snared by the Jehovah’s Witnesses who have charged the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity with absurdity. Certainly, a carefully study of the Scriptures are absolutely crucial to preventing thins kind of tragedy. Yet, also helpful if not necessary would be a careful philosophical defense of these doctrines which show their logical coherence. I believe that such apologetic material, designed to help Christians avoid falling victim to false religions and philosophies, ought not to be the purview of the ivory tower alone, but ought to be placed in the hands of the average Christian.
Conclusion
I know that I have barely scratched the surface of the issue of the role of philosophy in the Christian circles. I have left many questions unanswered. My primary goal here, however, was not to answer every question, but to simply pique enough interest among the Christians gathered here to at least take this issue seriously. If what I have said is anywhere near true, as general and undeveloped as it is, and if the anti-intellectualism that has gripped the church for decades is to be eradicated, then philosophy—good, Christian philosophy—must given a more significant role in the academy, the pulpit, and the pew. I think that we Christian philosophers already know this. Philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, J.P. Moreland, and William Lane Craig have been saying similar things for years. The task for us is to convince everybody else!
By speaking of the role of philosophy "in the pew," I mean to refer to the role of philosophy in the life of the average Christian believer as he seeks to live his life before the face of God each day and provide salt and light to the culture in which he lives. Much of what I have said above is applicable to the average believer. Apologetics and logic, especially, are disciplines that each and every Christian ought to spend some time studying in order to fulfill the obligations enjoined on him by the Great Commission (Matt. 2:19-20) and First Peter 3:15.
Beyond these, however, let me add a couple of more roles that philosophy can play in the life of the Christian in the pew. First, insofar as philosophy deals with the history of ideas and with the most basic questions that people ask—"What is real?", "How do we know?", "What is right and what is wrong?", "What is beautiful?""—it can help the Christian be a well-rounded, culturally literate citizen who can make a meaningful contribution to the well-being of his society. Unless you think that evangelism is the only reason Christians have been left in the world, then you will agree that we have a contribution to make to culture as culture, to society as society; that we have a responsibility to our fellow citizens to participate in establishing sound public policy, to make and support good art and good music, etc. Philosophy, through the study of the history of ideas and through philosophical analysis of ideas, can enable Christians to be responsibly engaged in these and every other aspect of human society, avoiding the mistakes of the past as well as the present. In line with my earlier discussion of "faith seeking understanding," philosophical study can also help the Christian inject Christian principles and values into the various spheres of culture, drawing out, for example, the implications of the Christian worldview for politics, education, art, and science.
Second, and closely related to the first point, philosophy can strengthen the Christian’s ability to discern truth from error. The Word of God tells us to "test the spirits" (1 John 4:1) and to avoid being "carried about by every wind of doctrine" (Eph. 4:14). The study of God’s Word is basic to this task, of course. But, I have pointed out that understanding and applying the Bible and formulating sound doctrine from the Scriptures is enhanced by theology’s handmaid, philosophy. Think, for example, of how many Christians have been snared by the Jehovah’s Witnesses who have charged the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity with absurdity. Certainly, a carefully study of the Scriptures are absolutely crucial to preventing thins kind of tragedy. Yet, also helpful if not necessary would be a careful philosophical defense of these doctrines which show their logical coherence. I believe that such apologetic material, designed to help Christians avoid falling victim to false religions and philosophies, ought not to be the purview of the ivory tower alone, but ought to be placed in the hands of the average Christian.
Conclusion
I know that I have barely scratched the surface of the issue of the role of philosophy in the Christian circles. I have left many questions unanswered. My primary goal here, however, was not to answer every question, but to simply pique enough interest among the Christians gathered here to at least take this issue seriously. If what I have said is anywhere near true, as general and undeveloped as it is, and if the anti-intellectualism that has gripped the church for decades is to be eradicated, then philosophy—good, Christian philosophy—must given a more significant role in the academy, the pulpit, and the pew. I think that we Christian philosophers already know this. Philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, J.P. Moreland, and William Lane Craig have been saying similar things for years. The task for us is to convince everybody else!
Oct 31, 2005
Preventing Dumbness: The Role of Philosophy in the Academy, the Pulpit, and the Pew - Part 2
In the Pulpit
Time does no permit me to say everything that might be said here, but I will focus on what I take to be the two most vital roles that philosophy can play in the life of the minister of God’s Word. First, philosophy is crucial if the minister is to fulfill the requirements of his apologetic calling. Of course, as First Peter 3:15 makes clear, all Christians are called to the apologetic task. Yet, the Gospel minister has a special responsibility here. People have tough questions. Many times these tough questions are an obstacle to faith. "Is it really rational to believe in the Christian God in our (post)modern society?" "How could a good and all-powerful God allow the attacks of September 11?" "Hasn’t critical biblical scholarship undermined the historical reliability of the Bible?"
In past generations, ministers seldom had to deal with theses kinds of questions because most people in our society would give mental assent to God’s existence and goodness, and to the authority of Scripture. But, no more. As Al Mohler, President of Southern Baptist Theological Seminary said recently to a group of seminary students, "[T]he apologetic task has never been more pressing, more urgent or more important. Indeed, I believe that at this critical time of cultural and intellectual transition, the Christian ministry, taken as a whole, must be understood as an apologetic calling."
The teaching and preaching of today’s gospel ministers must be heavily seasoned with apologetics. And I need not tell you the vital role that philosophy must play in apologetics. Minister’s, then, must read and study philosophical and apologetical works so that they can meet the challenges of our day in their pulpits.
Another way in which philosophy may play a role in the pulpit is in the area of logic. If you take a look at homiletics textbooks from days gone by, you will notice something that is universally absent from modern homiletics texts. They almost always contained chapters on logic and argumentation. Why? Because it was assumed that most if not all sermons would contain at least one argument. And this being the case, it was incumbent upon preachers to know how to formulate valid and sound arguments.
Now I happen to think that it is still incumbent upon preachers to know how to formulate good arguments. And I think this because I think that any good sermon will contain at least one argument, even if only an argument for the superiority of a particular interpretation of a text over against other possible interpretations. I long for the day in which homiletics texts once again include chapters on logic and argumentation. I think that this would greatly improve the quality of preaching in our pulpits.
I can recall hearing one sermon in which the preacher argued that in heaven human beings will be sexless—neither male nor female. Why? Because in Matthew 22:30 Jesus said, "For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are like the angels in heaven." But, anyone with a little logic in his head can see that the preacher’s conclusion does not follow from this text. In fact, this text supports neither the sexlessness of humans nor angels. All that follows logically from this text is that in heaven there will be no marriage. These and other similar errors could be avoided with a little training in logic. Fortunately, some seminaries and Christian colleges have courses in logic, but these are seldom required for the average divinity student. However, they should be required, or at least logic should be incorporated into homiletics. In either case, logic is a branch of philosophy, and training in logic is thus one important way that philosophy can play a role in the pulpit.
Time does no permit me to say everything that might be said here, but I will focus on what I take to be the two most vital roles that philosophy can play in the life of the minister of God’s Word. First, philosophy is crucial if the minister is to fulfill the requirements of his apologetic calling. Of course, as First Peter 3:15 makes clear, all Christians are called to the apologetic task. Yet, the Gospel minister has a special responsibility here. People have tough questions. Many times these tough questions are an obstacle to faith. "Is it really rational to believe in the Christian God in our (post)modern society?" "How could a good and all-powerful God allow the attacks of September 11?" "Hasn’t critical biblical scholarship undermined the historical reliability of the Bible?"
In past generations, ministers seldom had to deal with theses kinds of questions because most people in our society would give mental assent to God’s existence and goodness, and to the authority of Scripture. But, no more. As Al Mohler, President of Southern Baptist Theological Seminary said recently to a group of seminary students, "[T]he apologetic task has never been more pressing, more urgent or more important. Indeed, I believe that at this critical time of cultural and intellectual transition, the Christian ministry, taken as a whole, must be understood as an apologetic calling."
The teaching and preaching of today’s gospel ministers must be heavily seasoned with apologetics. And I need not tell you the vital role that philosophy must play in apologetics. Minister’s, then, must read and study philosophical and apologetical works so that they can meet the challenges of our day in their pulpits.
Another way in which philosophy may play a role in the pulpit is in the area of logic. If you take a look at homiletics textbooks from days gone by, you will notice something that is universally absent from modern homiletics texts. They almost always contained chapters on logic and argumentation. Why? Because it was assumed that most if not all sermons would contain at least one argument. And this being the case, it was incumbent upon preachers to know how to formulate valid and sound arguments.
Now I happen to think that it is still incumbent upon preachers to know how to formulate good arguments. And I think this because I think that any good sermon will contain at least one argument, even if only an argument for the superiority of a particular interpretation of a text over against other possible interpretations. I long for the day in which homiletics texts once again include chapters on logic and argumentation. I think that this would greatly improve the quality of preaching in our pulpits.
I can recall hearing one sermon in which the preacher argued that in heaven human beings will be sexless—neither male nor female. Why? Because in Matthew 22:30 Jesus said, "For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are like the angels in heaven." But, anyone with a little logic in his head can see that the preacher’s conclusion does not follow from this text. In fact, this text supports neither the sexlessness of humans nor angels. All that follows logically from this text is that in heaven there will be no marriage. These and other similar errors could be avoided with a little training in logic. Fortunately, some seminaries and Christian colleges have courses in logic, but these are seldom required for the average divinity student. However, they should be required, or at least logic should be incorporated into homiletics. In either case, logic is a branch of philosophy, and training in logic is thus one important way that philosophy can play a role in the pulpit.
Oct 24, 2005
Preventing Dumbness: The Role of Philosophy in the Academy, the Pulpit, and the Pew - Part 1
Some months ago, in my earliest blog posts, I discussed the the relationship between faith and reason and the importance of Christians to live by the motto "Faith Seeking Understanding." I would like to build on that discussion over the next few weeks by writing about the role of philosophy in the Chirstian life. A few years ago, I presented a paper at a regional meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society called "Preventing Dumbness: The Role of Philosophy in the Academy, the Pulpit, and the Pew." The overall goal of the paper was to offer some suggestions for how Christians in these three areas can avoid anti-intellectualism and the "dumbing down" of the faith. I post that paper here in three parts.
In the Academy
By the "academy" here I mean the Christian academy—the faculties of Christian colleges, universities, and seminaries, in particular those specializing in biblical and theological studies. What role may philosophy play in the academy regarding the alleviation of dumbness? The question, of course, presupposes that dumbness infects the Christian academy. Now it is not my intent to be pejorative or condescending in any way. There are many fine scholars in the Christian academy and I doubt that any Christian scholar wants or intends to be anti-intellectual or to uphold anything other than the highest intellectual and academic standards. Nevertheless, as William Lane Craig has written, "a measure of philosophical training can be a valuable asset to the systematic theologian." And we might add the biblical scholar, as well.
Theologians and biblical scholars make claims that have philosophical implications. Yet, often they do not realize those implications. At other times, theologians may try to articulate some Christian doctrine which, if they had some philosophical background, they might be able to articulate better and more clearly because philosophy is able to provide some concepts and technical vocabulary. In other words, as J.P. Moreland would put it, philosophy can help theology clarify internal conceptual problems. Wayne Grudem’s discussion of God’s omnipresence illustrates both of these problems simultaneously. Grudem defines God’s omnipresence as follows: "God does not have size or spatial dimensions and is present at every point of space with his whole being, yet God acts differently in different places." At first blush, this definition appears incoherent. Indeed, I think it is incoherent as it is stated. How can a being have no size or spatial dimension, and yet literally be present at every point of space? This seems equivalent to saying that God is not located in space, and yet he is present at every locale in space, a contradiction if ever there was one. Of course, Grudem is not totally unaware of the difficulty, and in his elaboration of this doctrine he appears to struggle to make sense of it. He asserts that God cannot be contained by any space, and that we should "guard against thinking that God extends infinitely far in all directions so that he himself exists in a sort of infinite, unending space." Well and good. But, then, he tries to illustrate God’s omnipresence on the analogy of a water-filled sponge. Water is present everywhere in the sponge, but is distinct from the sponge. But, this analogy clearly speaks of God in spatial terms in precisely the way that Grudem himself says that we ought not. Further, the analogy does not allow for God’s whole being to be present at every space. All of the water in the sponge is not present at any one place in the sponge.
I think that the philosopher can be of great help with this doctrine, and it would not take a great deal of time and trouble for the theologian to study and avail himself of the resources that the philosopher can provide in this regard. Philosophical theologians have resolved this paradox by explicating God’s omnipresence as a function of his omniscience and omnipotence. God, being a Spirit (cf. John 4:24), and thus immaterial, cannot literally be present at any location in space. That is, his being is not at any place. But, since he is omniscient, he knows about any and every place and what is going on there. And because he is omnipotent, he can extend his causal power to any and every place at will. So, to say that God is omnipresent is, strictly speaking, to speak figuratively. But, nothing of consequence is lost because, on this view, god is still "present" at every place in all the ways that matter. He knows every place and is able to act at every place.
Philosophy can also provide the discipline of theology, as it does other disciplines, with what J.P. Moreland calls "external conceptual problems." These would be problems arising in theology due to conflict with well-established propositions derived from sources outside theology. More technically,
An external conceptual problem arises for a theological doctrine or theory T when T conflicts with some doctrine of another theory T’, when T’ and its doctrines are rationally well-founded.
For example, certain astronomical observations regarding the distance of other galaxies from our own may be said to provide an external conceptual problem from science for Young-Earth Creationism. From the field of philosophy, an external conceptual problem for theology might be the philosophical arguments for an A-theory of time which (it could be argued) is inconsistent with the idea that God exists outside of time. In the face of such external conceptual problems (assuming for the sake of argument that these opposing theories are rationally well-founded), the theologian who held to Young-Earth Creation or Divine Timelessness would have to modify or jettison his views. In any case, the theologian’s appreciation and understanding of God’s revealed truth would be enhanced by engaging the challenges posed by these problems.
Another way in which philosophy may play an important role in the Christian academy is in the integration of academic disciplines. The term "university" has its etymology in the union of "unity" and "diversity", meaning that the university (which was created by Christians, by the way) is a place where the diversity of disciplines find their unity in a common frame of reference, a common worldview based in shared truths and values. Of course, most universities today, including Christian universities, are universities in name only. The various disciplines and departments do their work in relative isolation from each other, with little or no cognizance of how their research impacts other disciplines, and often reaching conclusions on the same subject matter that are mutually contradictory. In some Christian schools, the faculty of the Religion Department teaches special creation, while across the quad at the Biology Department the professors advocate theistic evolution. The English Department imbibes a deconstructionist view of language while the History Department "naively" plods along thinking that history is objectively knowable. Such problems usually go unnoticed because there is very little communication and interaction between the various disciplines.
But insofar as the academy sees value in having an integrated and consistent curriculum, where each department practices its discipline within the framework of a Christian world and life view—to that extent it should see the value of philosophy in providing the intellectual tools for achieving that goal. For reasons already cited above, philosophy as a discipline is uniquely qualified to guide the Christian university in the integration of the disciplines.
In the Academy
By the "academy" here I mean the Christian academy—the faculties of Christian colleges, universities, and seminaries, in particular those specializing in biblical and theological studies. What role may philosophy play in the academy regarding the alleviation of dumbness? The question, of course, presupposes that dumbness infects the Christian academy. Now it is not my intent to be pejorative or condescending in any way. There are many fine scholars in the Christian academy and I doubt that any Christian scholar wants or intends to be anti-intellectual or to uphold anything other than the highest intellectual and academic standards. Nevertheless, as William Lane Craig has written, "a measure of philosophical training can be a valuable asset to the systematic theologian." And we might add the biblical scholar, as well.
Theologians and biblical scholars make claims that have philosophical implications. Yet, often they do not realize those implications. At other times, theologians may try to articulate some Christian doctrine which, if they had some philosophical background, they might be able to articulate better and more clearly because philosophy is able to provide some concepts and technical vocabulary. In other words, as J.P. Moreland would put it, philosophy can help theology clarify internal conceptual problems. Wayne Grudem’s discussion of God’s omnipresence illustrates both of these problems simultaneously. Grudem defines God’s omnipresence as follows: "God does not have size or spatial dimensions and is present at every point of space with his whole being, yet God acts differently in different places." At first blush, this definition appears incoherent. Indeed, I think it is incoherent as it is stated. How can a being have no size or spatial dimension, and yet literally be present at every point of space? This seems equivalent to saying that God is not located in space, and yet he is present at every locale in space, a contradiction if ever there was one. Of course, Grudem is not totally unaware of the difficulty, and in his elaboration of this doctrine he appears to struggle to make sense of it. He asserts that God cannot be contained by any space, and that we should "guard against thinking that God extends infinitely far in all directions so that he himself exists in a sort of infinite, unending space." Well and good. But, then, he tries to illustrate God’s omnipresence on the analogy of a water-filled sponge. Water is present everywhere in the sponge, but is distinct from the sponge. But, this analogy clearly speaks of God in spatial terms in precisely the way that Grudem himself says that we ought not. Further, the analogy does not allow for God’s whole being to be present at every space. All of the water in the sponge is not present at any one place in the sponge.
I think that the philosopher can be of great help with this doctrine, and it would not take a great deal of time and trouble for the theologian to study and avail himself of the resources that the philosopher can provide in this regard. Philosophical theologians have resolved this paradox by explicating God’s omnipresence as a function of his omniscience and omnipotence. God, being a Spirit (cf. John 4:24), and thus immaterial, cannot literally be present at any location in space. That is, his being is not at any place. But, since he is omniscient, he knows about any and every place and what is going on there. And because he is omnipotent, he can extend his causal power to any and every place at will. So, to say that God is omnipresent is, strictly speaking, to speak figuratively. But, nothing of consequence is lost because, on this view, god is still "present" at every place in all the ways that matter. He knows every place and is able to act at every place.
Philosophy can also provide the discipline of theology, as it does other disciplines, with what J.P. Moreland calls "external conceptual problems." These would be problems arising in theology due to conflict with well-established propositions derived from sources outside theology. More technically,
An external conceptual problem arises for a theological doctrine or theory T when T conflicts with some doctrine of another theory T’, when T’ and its doctrines are rationally well-founded.
For example, certain astronomical observations regarding the distance of other galaxies from our own may be said to provide an external conceptual problem from science for Young-Earth Creationism. From the field of philosophy, an external conceptual problem for theology might be the philosophical arguments for an A-theory of time which (it could be argued) is inconsistent with the idea that God exists outside of time. In the face of such external conceptual problems (assuming for the sake of argument that these opposing theories are rationally well-founded), the theologian who held to Young-Earth Creation or Divine Timelessness would have to modify or jettison his views. In any case, the theologian’s appreciation and understanding of God’s revealed truth would be enhanced by engaging the challenges posed by these problems.
Another way in which philosophy may play an important role in the Christian academy is in the integration of academic disciplines. The term "university" has its etymology in the union of "unity" and "diversity", meaning that the university (which was created by Christians, by the way) is a place where the diversity of disciplines find their unity in a common frame of reference, a common worldview based in shared truths and values. Of course, most universities today, including Christian universities, are universities in name only. The various disciplines and departments do their work in relative isolation from each other, with little or no cognizance of how their research impacts other disciplines, and often reaching conclusions on the same subject matter that are mutually contradictory. In some Christian schools, the faculty of the Religion Department teaches special creation, while across the quad at the Biology Department the professors advocate theistic evolution. The English Department imbibes a deconstructionist view of language while the History Department "naively" plods along thinking that history is objectively knowable. Such problems usually go unnoticed because there is very little communication and interaction between the various disciplines.
But insofar as the academy sees value in having an integrated and consistent curriculum, where each department practices its discipline within the framework of a Christian world and life view—to that extent it should see the value of philosophy in providing the intellectual tools for achieving that goal. For reasons already cited above, philosophy as a discipline is uniquely qualified to guide the Christian university in the integration of the disciplines.
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