The next issue of Areopagus Journal (due out in a week or two) will highlight the contribution of three 20th-century men to the field of apologetics (the rational defense of the Christian faith). These three men are C.S. Lewis, Francis Schaeffer, and Alvin Plantinga.
These men are significantly different in their aproaches to apologetics, as well as in their various intellectual skills. Yet, in their own way, they have made a huge impact on the Christian church and on our culture. Of course, there are many other contemporary apologists we could have highlighted in this journal issue. We did not select these three because we agree with everything they wrote. We don't. These were selected because, without doubt, they have had the greatest overall influence on the field--Lewis and Schaeffer primarily at the popular level, and Plantinga at the academic level.
I hope that you will order a copy of the journal and read about these giants of the faith. You can order Areopagus Journal at: www.arcapologetics.org.
May 19, 2006
Apr 19, 2006
The Gospel of Judas: More Gnostic Nonsense
Last Sunday night I watched the National Geographic Special on “The Gospel of Judas.” As usual with other recent programs of this sort that deal with the topic of the historical Jesus, I came away somewhat frustrated, perhaps even angry—not because the program attacked my personal beliefs or challenged the truth of Christianity, but because (once again) shoddy historical research and politically motivated revisionist history were being passed on to a gullible, biblically illiterate public as indisputable fact.
The Gospel of Judas is a Gnostic gospel similar in many respects to other “lost” gospels that have become the subject of popular discussion in recent years due to the popularity of the best-seller, The Da Vinci Code—works such as the Gospel of Thomas and the Gospel of Mary Magdalene. As The Gospel of Judas has it, Judas was not the villain that orthodox Christians have portrayed for 2000 years. Rather, he was Jesus’ most trusted disciple, and the only one who truly understood his mission. According to the story, Jesus actually gave Judas the task of “betraying” him so that Jesus could die on the cross and be freed from his physical body (Gnostics believe physical stuff to be evil). So, Jesus’ betrayal and death were apparently not evil acts in themselves, but spiritual necessities designed to release Jesus from a physical prison. Rather than an evil traitor, Judas was actually a hero and the recipient of the secret knowledge (gnosis) required for true salvation.
Now why is this a big deal? Why would we think this Gnostic gospel anything more than a harmless historical curiosity? It’s because the producers of the National Geographic special, inspired by the revisionist history of Elaine Pagels and Bart Ehrman (the two scholars given the bulk of the airtime on the show), are pushing the idea that the Gospel of Judas presents us with a picture of Jesus and of early Christianity that is just as authentic, and perhaps more authentic, than the portrait of Jesus and the church that we find in the four canonical gospels, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.
Ehrman and Pagels have made a name for themselves in recent years by pushing the thesis that in early Christianity there was no “orthodoxy,” no single standard of belief about the identity and mission of Jesus. Instead, the early church manifested a great deal of doctrinal diversity with many different, even conflicting, views of Jesus. What is their proof for this idea?—the so-called Gnostic Gospels, many of which were contained in the Nag Hammadi library, a collection of Gnostic works discovered in Egypt in 1945. So, according to Pagels and Ehrman (and the National Geographic Society), there existed in the early church about 30 gospels, not just four, and these gospels show that early Christianity was a mosh-posh of theological traditions and it wasn’t until the third and fourth centuries that the camp we call “orthodox Christianity” one supremacy through political oppression of opposing version of Christianity.
It ought to be enough to respond to this theory with one word: hogwash! For that is exactly what it is. Unfortunately, many people (even church-going people) are being misled by the likes of Pagels and Ehrman. So, a more substantial response is called for. There is not time or space here to be thorough, but let me offer the following remarks in rebuttal:
1. The Gnostic Gospels cannot support the Pagels-Ehrman thesis about early church diversity for several reasons. First, because the Gnostic gospels (including the Gospel of Judas) did not exist in the early church. The manuscripts of the Nag Hammadi library were transcribed between A.D. 350-400. And there is no evidence whatsoever that any of these books were written before A.D. 150. Before that time, the Gnostic gospels were unknown—which is a strong indication that they were not written until after that time. Concerning the Gospel of Judas, we have a reference to it in the works of the church father Irenaeus in the year 180. So, we can know that this gospel existed at that time. However, there is no reason to think that it existed prior to that time. Second, we know that all four canonical gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John) were written in the first century, during the apostolic era. What is more, some time before Irenaeus, the canonical gospels became universally accepted throughout the church as authoritative and divinely inspired works. For instance, the Muratorian Canon (c. 170) lists the four gospels along with 16 other New Testament books as homologoumena (books accepted as authoritative by all the church). Though containing many differences, these four gospels nevertheless tell the same basic story about Jesus and identify him as fully human and fully divine (and they paint Judas as a traitorous villain). No other gospels as close to the life of Jesus as these four existed in the early church, least of all the Gnostic gospels.
2. There is ample evidence from early Christian documents that there was a single, orthodox Christian faith from the very beginning. First Corinthians was written by Paul about A.D. 55. In 1 Corinthians 15:1-8, Paul speaks of the gospel message he “received” and “passed on” to others. That message included the account of the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus (the latter is especially important since Gnostics do not believe in a bodily resurrection). The words of this text are written in a highly formulaic style indicative of a creedal statement. So, what Paul is saying is that he had earlier “received” this creed and had passed it on to the Corinthians. When did Paul receive this doctrinal tradition? No doubt, he received it on his visit to Jerusalem as recorded in Galatians 1:18-19). This means (as most critical scholars acknowledge) that this creed dates no later than A.D. 40, within ten years of Jesus’ death. This same Paul also says in Galatians (his earliest epistle, written about A.D. 49) that there is only one gospel message, and any teacher who deviates from that message is accursed—a clear indication of a standard of orthodoxy. Elsewhere, Paul states that there is “one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all” (Eph. 4:5). Throughout the New Testament, in books known to be early first century documents, there are numerous exhortations to hold on to sound doctrine and warnings against false doctrine (Matt. 24:4-14; Col. 2:8-9, 16-23; 2 Tim. 4:1-5; Heb. 13:9; 2 Pet. 2; 1 John 2:18-23; 4:2-3; Jude). All of this is a clear indication that there was a discernable Christian orthodoxy in the early, first-century church, long before the advent of Gnosticism and the writing of the Gnostic gospels.
3. Another point is worth mentioning. The earliest Christian canon was the Hebrew Scriptures, the Old Testament. These Scriptures taught that the world (and material things) was created by God and was inherently good. This fact explains very clearly why the Gnostic gospels could not possibly have been taken seriously by early Christians and could not possibly have been just one, competing “version” of Christianity. The Gnostics rejected the goodness of the created order and they rejected the authority of the Old Testament, believing that the God of the Old Testament was not really God, but an evil spirit who rebelled against the true God. The presence and authority of the Old Testament in the early church provides the reductio ad absurdum to the Pagels-Ehrman thesis that Gnosticism was an authentic expression of early Christianity.
The Gospel of Judas is a Gnostic gospel similar in many respects to other “lost” gospels that have become the subject of popular discussion in recent years due to the popularity of the best-seller, The Da Vinci Code—works such as the Gospel of Thomas and the Gospel of Mary Magdalene. As The Gospel of Judas has it, Judas was not the villain that orthodox Christians have portrayed for 2000 years. Rather, he was Jesus’ most trusted disciple, and the only one who truly understood his mission. According to the story, Jesus actually gave Judas the task of “betraying” him so that Jesus could die on the cross and be freed from his physical body (Gnostics believe physical stuff to be evil). So, Jesus’ betrayal and death were apparently not evil acts in themselves, but spiritual necessities designed to release Jesus from a physical prison. Rather than an evil traitor, Judas was actually a hero and the recipient of the secret knowledge (gnosis) required for true salvation.
Now why is this a big deal? Why would we think this Gnostic gospel anything more than a harmless historical curiosity? It’s because the producers of the National Geographic special, inspired by the revisionist history of Elaine Pagels and Bart Ehrman (the two scholars given the bulk of the airtime on the show), are pushing the idea that the Gospel of Judas presents us with a picture of Jesus and of early Christianity that is just as authentic, and perhaps more authentic, than the portrait of Jesus and the church that we find in the four canonical gospels, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.
Ehrman and Pagels have made a name for themselves in recent years by pushing the thesis that in early Christianity there was no “orthodoxy,” no single standard of belief about the identity and mission of Jesus. Instead, the early church manifested a great deal of doctrinal diversity with many different, even conflicting, views of Jesus. What is their proof for this idea?—the so-called Gnostic Gospels, many of which were contained in the Nag Hammadi library, a collection of Gnostic works discovered in Egypt in 1945. So, according to Pagels and Ehrman (and the National Geographic Society), there existed in the early church about 30 gospels, not just four, and these gospels show that early Christianity was a mosh-posh of theological traditions and it wasn’t until the third and fourth centuries that the camp we call “orthodox Christianity” one supremacy through political oppression of opposing version of Christianity.
It ought to be enough to respond to this theory with one word: hogwash! For that is exactly what it is. Unfortunately, many people (even church-going people) are being misled by the likes of Pagels and Ehrman. So, a more substantial response is called for. There is not time or space here to be thorough, but let me offer the following remarks in rebuttal:
1. The Gnostic Gospels cannot support the Pagels-Ehrman thesis about early church diversity for several reasons. First, because the Gnostic gospels (including the Gospel of Judas) did not exist in the early church. The manuscripts of the Nag Hammadi library were transcribed between A.D. 350-400. And there is no evidence whatsoever that any of these books were written before A.D. 150. Before that time, the Gnostic gospels were unknown—which is a strong indication that they were not written until after that time. Concerning the Gospel of Judas, we have a reference to it in the works of the church father Irenaeus in the year 180. So, we can know that this gospel existed at that time. However, there is no reason to think that it existed prior to that time. Second, we know that all four canonical gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John) were written in the first century, during the apostolic era. What is more, some time before Irenaeus, the canonical gospels became universally accepted throughout the church as authoritative and divinely inspired works. For instance, the Muratorian Canon (c. 170) lists the four gospels along with 16 other New Testament books as homologoumena (books accepted as authoritative by all the church). Though containing many differences, these four gospels nevertheless tell the same basic story about Jesus and identify him as fully human and fully divine (and they paint Judas as a traitorous villain). No other gospels as close to the life of Jesus as these four existed in the early church, least of all the Gnostic gospels.
2. There is ample evidence from early Christian documents that there was a single, orthodox Christian faith from the very beginning. First Corinthians was written by Paul about A.D. 55. In 1 Corinthians 15:1-8, Paul speaks of the gospel message he “received” and “passed on” to others. That message included the account of the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus (the latter is especially important since Gnostics do not believe in a bodily resurrection). The words of this text are written in a highly formulaic style indicative of a creedal statement. So, what Paul is saying is that he had earlier “received” this creed and had passed it on to the Corinthians. When did Paul receive this doctrinal tradition? No doubt, he received it on his visit to Jerusalem as recorded in Galatians 1:18-19). This means (as most critical scholars acknowledge) that this creed dates no later than A.D. 40, within ten years of Jesus’ death. This same Paul also says in Galatians (his earliest epistle, written about A.D. 49) that there is only one gospel message, and any teacher who deviates from that message is accursed—a clear indication of a standard of orthodoxy. Elsewhere, Paul states that there is “one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all” (Eph. 4:5). Throughout the New Testament, in books known to be early first century documents, there are numerous exhortations to hold on to sound doctrine and warnings against false doctrine (Matt. 24:4-14; Col. 2:8-9, 16-23; 2 Tim. 4:1-5; Heb. 13:9; 2 Pet. 2; 1 John 2:18-23; 4:2-3; Jude). All of this is a clear indication that there was a discernable Christian orthodoxy in the early, first-century church, long before the advent of Gnosticism and the writing of the Gnostic gospels.
3. Another point is worth mentioning. The earliest Christian canon was the Hebrew Scriptures, the Old Testament. These Scriptures taught that the world (and material things) was created by God and was inherently good. This fact explains very clearly why the Gnostic gospels could not possibly have been taken seriously by early Christians and could not possibly have been just one, competing “version” of Christianity. The Gnostics rejected the goodness of the created order and they rejected the authority of the Old Testament, believing that the God of the Old Testament was not really God, but an evil spirit who rebelled against the true God. The presence and authority of the Old Testament in the early church provides the reductio ad absurdum to the Pagels-Ehrman thesis that Gnosticism was an authentic expression of early Christianity.
Apr 6, 2006
Christianity vs. Immigration Reform?
Watching the news in recent days you would never guess that Christians are anything but anti-immigration reform and pro-illegal immigrants. Spokesmen for the church in the media (usually Catholic) seem, for the most part, to advocate preventing the government from stopping illegal immigration from Mexico. In particular, they oppose the government's doing anything to stop churches/Christians from aiding or even harboring illegal immigrants. Appeals are made to the ethics of Jesus, to his concern for the down-trodden and outcast, to his demand that his followers "give a drink of water" to the thirsty.
Well, I'm a Christian. A Bible-believing Christian. A Christian who takes the teachings of Jesus very seriously (as divinely inspired and inerrant, in fact). And I just don't get it. I don't see the connection between Christian faith and Jesus' teaching on the one hand, and the aversion to immigration reform on the other. In fact, as a Christian, I believe that it is morally wrong to abet, harbor, or employ an illegal alien. This does not mean that I think we shouldn't sympathize with the plight of the impoverished Latin Americans who are seeking a better life in this country. It doesn't mean that I think we shouldn't feed them if their hungry or clothe them if they're naked (we should, after all, obey the teachings of God rather than men).
However, I also believe that, as a Christian, when I hand the illegal alien a drink of water with one hand, I ought with the other hand to dial up the U.S. Border Patrol and turn them in for a quick deportation to their home country. God establishes human government in order to establish and maintain justice, and to secure the peace and safety of its citizens (Romans. 13:1-7). And I am called as a Christian to submit to the governing authorities and support them in their God-given task.
It seems evident to me that by not securing our border and allowing the constant flood of illegal immigrants to cross our borders the government is failing in its duty to protect our security. This is a national security issue! Any one of those illegals could be carrying a nuclear bomb! Moreover, to harbor the illegal aliens and not turn them over to the authorities is to disobey the government laws (just laws, by the way) without sufficient cause, and to encourage more people to break those laws.
No, there is nothing un-Christian about supporting immigration reform and the enforcement of immigration laws. Quite the contrary. It is a failure of Christian duty to do otherwise.
Well, I'm a Christian. A Bible-believing Christian. A Christian who takes the teachings of Jesus very seriously (as divinely inspired and inerrant, in fact). And I just don't get it. I don't see the connection between Christian faith and Jesus' teaching on the one hand, and the aversion to immigration reform on the other. In fact, as a Christian, I believe that it is morally wrong to abet, harbor, or employ an illegal alien. This does not mean that I think we shouldn't sympathize with the plight of the impoverished Latin Americans who are seeking a better life in this country. It doesn't mean that I think we shouldn't feed them if their hungry or clothe them if they're naked (we should, after all, obey the teachings of God rather than men).
However, I also believe that, as a Christian, when I hand the illegal alien a drink of water with one hand, I ought with the other hand to dial up the U.S. Border Patrol and turn them in for a quick deportation to their home country. God establishes human government in order to establish and maintain justice, and to secure the peace and safety of its citizens (Romans. 13:1-7). And I am called as a Christian to submit to the governing authorities and support them in their God-given task.
It seems evident to me that by not securing our border and allowing the constant flood of illegal immigrants to cross our borders the government is failing in its duty to protect our security. This is a national security issue! Any one of those illegals could be carrying a nuclear bomb! Moreover, to harbor the illegal aliens and not turn them over to the authorities is to disobey the government laws (just laws, by the way) without sufficient cause, and to encourage more people to break those laws.
No, there is nothing un-Christian about supporting immigration reform and the enforcement of immigration laws. Quite the contrary. It is a failure of Christian duty to do otherwise.
Mar 24, 2006
The Da Vinci Code: Coming Soon to a Theater Near You!
In just a few weeks, the movie adaptation of Dan Brown's bestseller The DaVinci Code will hit the silver screeen. How should Christians respond to this? Should we take notice? Should we see the movie? Should we protest? Should we rant and rave about one more attack on Christians in the culture war?
I suggest that we not rant and rave or protest per se. I do suggest that we see the movie, perhaps even read the book. For one thing, judged purely as a work of literature, it is a descent novel (and I trust an exciting movie). It is not Tolstoy or Hemingway, but it is a page-turner and a good piece of escapist fiction--I know, I've read the book and thoroughly enjoyed it--accept when the author made me mad with some of his absurd claims about church history. For another thing, if we are going to criticize something, we need to know what we're criticizing (and btw the book contains no gratuitous or explicit sex or violence). Finally, I think the release of this movie can allow Christians an opportunity to speak the truth in love to our neighbors, many of whom will be deceived and misled by the erroneous historical claims made by Brown.
So why not see the movie, read and study some of the Christian reviews and critiques of the book, and then deliberately set out to engage your friends and neighbors in a loving, but hopefully fruitful dialogue about the real Jesus who is God in the flesh, who died on the cross to save us from our sins.
I suggest that we not rant and rave or protest per se. I do suggest that we see the movie, perhaps even read the book. For one thing, judged purely as a work of literature, it is a descent novel (and I trust an exciting movie). It is not Tolstoy or Hemingway, but it is a page-turner and a good piece of escapist fiction--I know, I've read the book and thoroughly enjoyed it--accept when the author made me mad with some of his absurd claims about church history. For another thing, if we are going to criticize something, we need to know what we're criticizing (and btw the book contains no gratuitous or explicit sex or violence). Finally, I think the release of this movie can allow Christians an opportunity to speak the truth in love to our neighbors, many of whom will be deceived and misled by the erroneous historical claims made by Brown.
So why not see the movie, read and study some of the Christian reviews and critiques of the book, and then deliberately set out to engage your friends and neighbors in a loving, but hopefully fruitful dialogue about the real Jesus who is God in the flesh, who died on the cross to save us from our sins.
Mar 2, 2006
Sovereignty and Free Will Revisited
Cedar of lebanon asked some good questions about an earlier blog post on the relationship between God's sovereignty and human freedom. His post and my response are somewhat lengthy, so I enter it here as a new post...
cedar of lebanon said...
I was having trouble with this argument and one of the problems I thought I saw was that the two options, Job A or Job B, did not seem to be a true moral choice where there is clearly right and wrong.
My first gut reaction at this point is to say that you may have missed the point of my argument. The whole point was that if a person makes a choice (a moral one or not) without a sufficient reason for that choice, then he is acting arbitrarily and irrationally-- a mark typically seen with people and actions which we deem non-morally culpable. The conclusion being that libertarianism suggests that agents are not morally responsible for their actions. Anyway, let's see where you go with this...
To promote thought regarding this I have re-written the discussion, but replaced the character and the choices with something more familiar.
Suppose there is a person named Joseph, who is trying to decide between two options. Let us label the first option "sleep with Potaphar’s wife" and the second option "run." And let us suppose that there are reasons in favor of Joseph choosing to sleep with her, and other reasons in favor of Joseph choosing to run. The former we will call RA and the latter RB. Now RA may include such factors as the desire for pleasure, a feeling of power and importance, and so on. But, other equally significant factors support running, so that RB includes the fact the God would be pleased if he ran, he would not betray Potiphar, and so on.
Now suppose that Joseph finally decides to accept the offer to sleep with her. We need to ask the question, then, "Why did Joseph choose this option?" The libertarian, being an indeterminist, cannot say that the reasons Joseph had for this option—RA—compelled or determined that Joseph choose that option. Joseph, being free, could have done otherwise. But, I want to suggest that if Joseph had free will when he choose to sleep with her, then his actions were random and arbitrary in such a way that he could not possibly be morally responsible for choosing to do this.The libertarian, of course, will cry foul at this point. "How can Joseph’s choice be arbitrary since he had some reasons—RA—for choosing it?"
Well, I can agree that RA can be meaningfully cited as reasons for why Joseph chose to sleep with her, but I submit that the libertarian has answered the wrong question. The salient question is not, "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her?", but "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her rather than run?" I do not think that the libertarian can answer this question satisfactorily.In fact, I believe that the libertarian indeterminist is caught on the horns of a dilemma: The question is, "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her rather than run?" Either there is an answer to this question or there is not. If there is an answer, then Joseph's choice is determined (and indeterminism is false). If there is no answer, then Joseph's choice is made arbitrarily. So, if indeterminism is true, then Joseph's choice is a random choice, and his moral responsibility for that choice is vitiated. Let me present this dilemma a bit more formally:
(1) Either there is a causally sufficient reason why Joseph chose to sleep with her rather than run, or there is not.
(2) If there is a causally sufficient reason why, then Joseph's choice is determined.
(3) If there is no causally sufficient reason why, then Joseph's choice is arbitrary.
In defense of (3), let us imagine three different scenarios regarding the relative weight of the reasons Joseph may have with respect to the two options. First, suppose that Joseph's reasons for choosing either option are equally weighted. That is, let it be the case that RA provides no motivation to prefer sleeping with her to running, and vice versa. If so, then it seems that there is no reason why Joseph chose sleeping with her rather than running, even though he did have the considerations of RA in favor of sleeping with her. Would not his choice to sleep with her rather than run be just as arbitrary as if he had no reasons for choosing either option (i.e., if both RA and RB did not exist)? So it seems. So, how does adding equally weighted reasons for the respective options diminish the arbitrariness of the choice in such a way as to ground Joseph's moral responsibility?
The difficulty does not go away if we assume that RA and RB are not equally weighted. Suppose that RA makes the choice of sleeping with her more preferable, so preferable in fact that it would be clearly irrational to choose to run. The indeterminist/libertarian would still maintain that there is no causally sufficient reason why Joseph chooses to sleep with her (if in fact he does choose to sleep with her). Joseph is perfectly capable of choosing to run in this situation. But, the compatibilist can reply that moral responsibility would come down, on this view, to having the ability to make an irrational choice. And who would want such an ability?
But, what if RA is weightier than RB, but not by a great margin? That is, would our assessment of Joseph's moral responsibility be any different if he had some reason to prefer sleeping with her to runing, yet that reason was not so overwhelmingly preferable that running instead would seem obviously crazy? I don't think so. It would still turn out to be irrational to choose to run if Joseph could not say anything in explanation of his choice.
To see this, imagine two possible worlds, W1 and W2, that both contain our character Joseph. And let us assume that in both worlds he has some small preference for sleeping with Potaphar’s wife as opposed to running (but not a very strong preference). Now suppose also that in both worlds Joseph opts for running (the less preferable choice). Intuitively, is seems possible for such a choice to be made, and we would not, in ordinary situations, immediately charge someone who made such a choice with irrationality. Let us suppose, for example, that in W1 Joseph, if asked why he chose to run rather than sleep with her, would reply, "I just had a gut feeling about sleeping with her." We would be prone, I think, to accept this answer and not consider Joseph irrational because acting on a gut feeling is often the appropriate thing to do and does in fact constitute a reason for Joseph to really prefer running after all. It's the presence of this reason that explains why we are willing to give Joseph's rationality (in W1) the benefit of the doubt.
However, suppose that things are slightly different with respect to Joseph in W2. Suppose that he had no gut feelings about running that influenced him to choose it in spite of adultery’s apparent preferability. We ask, "So even though adultery seemed more preferable on purely rational grounds, you chose to run because it appealed to you in some unspecifiable way?" Joseph replies, "No, sleeping with her appealed to me more. I just picked running. No reason." It would be safe to conclude that Joseph is irrational. He quite arbitrarily chose to run rather than commit adultery against clear reasons for the latter, and he did so for absolutely no reason. Hence, it would seem that the indeterminist wants us to ground responsibility in the ability to act irrationally. But, I submit that there is no reason that we should go along with this. When people act irrationally and arbitrarily, we tend to think that they are defective in some way—in a way that causes us to mitigate their moral responsibility. So, it would seem that libertarian free will is actually inconsistent with moral responsibility.
What do I conclude from all this? When confronted with the apparent problem of reconciling God’s sovereignty and free will, there is no reason to follow the Arminian in opting for free will and rejecting divine sovereignty, nor is there any need to paradoxically hold these concepts in tension. Because the only motivation for holding on to free will—the need to preserve moral responsibility—has no force. Moral responsibility does not require free will, and thus there is no reason, no motive, to diminish God’s sovereignty.
+++ I believe there are difficulties with this argument. Please comment. Thank you. cs +++
Well, cs, after reading your revision of the argument, substituting the Joseph story for my Smith's job-offer story, I honestly can't see any relevant differences that would cause me to change my view or revise my assessment of the story's significance. If Joseph chooses the less preferable option (preferable from his own perspective, mind you) for absolutely no reason, then Joseph is acting irrationally--irrationally in such a way as to make us think that there is something wrong with him. He makes the less preferable choice as sort of a "glitch" in his will--a choice that is very hard to even describe as a real choice rather than as an accident, something that happens to him, rather than something he does. If I actually met this "Joseph" character, and he told me that he literally made the "choice" for no reason, I would have to conclude either (1) he is lying (perhaps to himself as well as me) and he really does have a reason for his choice after all, or (2) he is sick or mentally defective--in which case he is not morally responsible.
If you think my assessment is mistaken, I'd be glad to entertain any critical remarks you might have.
cedar of lebanon said...
I was having trouble with this argument and one of the problems I thought I saw was that the two options, Job A or Job B, did not seem to be a true moral choice where there is clearly right and wrong.
My first gut reaction at this point is to say that you may have missed the point of my argument. The whole point was that if a person makes a choice (a moral one or not) without a sufficient reason for that choice, then he is acting arbitrarily and irrationally-- a mark typically seen with people and actions which we deem non-morally culpable. The conclusion being that libertarianism suggests that agents are not morally responsible for their actions. Anyway, let's see where you go with this...
To promote thought regarding this I have re-written the discussion, but replaced the character and the choices with something more familiar.
Suppose there is a person named Joseph, who is trying to decide between two options. Let us label the first option "sleep with Potaphar’s wife" and the second option "run." And let us suppose that there are reasons in favor of Joseph choosing to sleep with her, and other reasons in favor of Joseph choosing to run. The former we will call RA and the latter RB. Now RA may include such factors as the desire for pleasure, a feeling of power and importance, and so on. But, other equally significant factors support running, so that RB includes the fact the God would be pleased if he ran, he would not betray Potiphar, and so on.
Now suppose that Joseph finally decides to accept the offer to sleep with her. We need to ask the question, then, "Why did Joseph choose this option?" The libertarian, being an indeterminist, cannot say that the reasons Joseph had for this option—RA—compelled or determined that Joseph choose that option. Joseph, being free, could have done otherwise. But, I want to suggest that if Joseph had free will when he choose to sleep with her, then his actions were random and arbitrary in such a way that he could not possibly be morally responsible for choosing to do this.The libertarian, of course, will cry foul at this point. "How can Joseph’s choice be arbitrary since he had some reasons—RA—for choosing it?"
Well, I can agree that RA can be meaningfully cited as reasons for why Joseph chose to sleep with her, but I submit that the libertarian has answered the wrong question. The salient question is not, "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her?", but "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her rather than run?" I do not think that the libertarian can answer this question satisfactorily.In fact, I believe that the libertarian indeterminist is caught on the horns of a dilemma: The question is, "Why did Joseph choose to sleep with her rather than run?" Either there is an answer to this question or there is not. If there is an answer, then Joseph's choice is determined (and indeterminism is false). If there is no answer, then Joseph's choice is made arbitrarily. So, if indeterminism is true, then Joseph's choice is a random choice, and his moral responsibility for that choice is vitiated. Let me present this dilemma a bit more formally:
(1) Either there is a causally sufficient reason why Joseph chose to sleep with her rather than run, or there is not.
(2) If there is a causally sufficient reason why, then Joseph's choice is determined.
(3) If there is no causally sufficient reason why, then Joseph's choice is arbitrary.
In defense of (3), let us imagine three different scenarios regarding the relative weight of the reasons Joseph may have with respect to the two options. First, suppose that Joseph's reasons for choosing either option are equally weighted. That is, let it be the case that RA provides no motivation to prefer sleeping with her to running, and vice versa. If so, then it seems that there is no reason why Joseph chose sleeping with her rather than running, even though he did have the considerations of RA in favor of sleeping with her. Would not his choice to sleep with her rather than run be just as arbitrary as if he had no reasons for choosing either option (i.e., if both RA and RB did not exist)? So it seems. So, how does adding equally weighted reasons for the respective options diminish the arbitrariness of the choice in such a way as to ground Joseph's moral responsibility?
The difficulty does not go away if we assume that RA and RB are not equally weighted. Suppose that RA makes the choice of sleeping with her more preferable, so preferable in fact that it would be clearly irrational to choose to run. The indeterminist/libertarian would still maintain that there is no causally sufficient reason why Joseph chooses to sleep with her (if in fact he does choose to sleep with her). Joseph is perfectly capable of choosing to run in this situation. But, the compatibilist can reply that moral responsibility would come down, on this view, to having the ability to make an irrational choice. And who would want such an ability?
But, what if RA is weightier than RB, but not by a great margin? That is, would our assessment of Joseph's moral responsibility be any different if he had some reason to prefer sleeping with her to runing, yet that reason was not so overwhelmingly preferable that running instead would seem obviously crazy? I don't think so. It would still turn out to be irrational to choose to run if Joseph could not say anything in explanation of his choice.
To see this, imagine two possible worlds, W1 and W2, that both contain our character Joseph. And let us assume that in both worlds he has some small preference for sleeping with Potaphar’s wife as opposed to running (but not a very strong preference). Now suppose also that in both worlds Joseph opts for running (the less preferable choice). Intuitively, is seems possible for such a choice to be made, and we would not, in ordinary situations, immediately charge someone who made such a choice with irrationality. Let us suppose, for example, that in W1 Joseph, if asked why he chose to run rather than sleep with her, would reply, "I just had a gut feeling about sleeping with her." We would be prone, I think, to accept this answer and not consider Joseph irrational because acting on a gut feeling is often the appropriate thing to do and does in fact constitute a reason for Joseph to really prefer running after all. It's the presence of this reason that explains why we are willing to give Joseph's rationality (in W1) the benefit of the doubt.
However, suppose that things are slightly different with respect to Joseph in W2. Suppose that he had no gut feelings about running that influenced him to choose it in spite of adultery’s apparent preferability. We ask, "So even though adultery seemed more preferable on purely rational grounds, you chose to run because it appealed to you in some unspecifiable way?" Joseph replies, "No, sleeping with her appealed to me more. I just picked running. No reason." It would be safe to conclude that Joseph is irrational. He quite arbitrarily chose to run rather than commit adultery against clear reasons for the latter, and he did so for absolutely no reason. Hence, it would seem that the indeterminist wants us to ground responsibility in the ability to act irrationally. But, I submit that there is no reason that we should go along with this. When people act irrationally and arbitrarily, we tend to think that they are defective in some way—in a way that causes us to mitigate their moral responsibility. So, it would seem that libertarian free will is actually inconsistent with moral responsibility.
What do I conclude from all this? When confronted with the apparent problem of reconciling God’s sovereignty and free will, there is no reason to follow the Arminian in opting for free will and rejecting divine sovereignty, nor is there any need to paradoxically hold these concepts in tension. Because the only motivation for holding on to free will—the need to preserve moral responsibility—has no force. Moral responsibility does not require free will, and thus there is no reason, no motive, to diminish God’s sovereignty.
+++ I believe there are difficulties with this argument. Please comment. Thank you. cs +++
Well, cs, after reading your revision of the argument, substituting the Joseph story for my Smith's job-offer story, I honestly can't see any relevant differences that would cause me to change my view or revise my assessment of the story's significance. If Joseph chooses the less preferable option (preferable from his own perspective, mind you) for absolutely no reason, then Joseph is acting irrationally--irrationally in such a way as to make us think that there is something wrong with him. He makes the less preferable choice as sort of a "glitch" in his will--a choice that is very hard to even describe as a real choice rather than as an accident, something that happens to him, rather than something he does. If I actually met this "Joseph" character, and he told me that he literally made the "choice" for no reason, I would have to conclude either (1) he is lying (perhaps to himself as well as me) and he really does have a reason for his choice after all, or (2) he is sick or mentally defective--in which case he is not morally responsible.
If you think my assessment is mistaken, I'd be glad to entertain any critical remarks you might have.
Feb 3, 2006
Alabama Churches Set Ablaze!
I awoke early this morning to the news that six churches in rural Alabama (Bibb and Chilton counties) had been damaged by fire during the night. At least two of the churches were burned to the ground. Though investigators have not yet said so, this is undoubtedly the work of arsonists.
Race does not appear to be a factor since the churches set ablaze represented both black and white congregations. This suggests that the motive of the arsonist(s) could have been religious or perhaps political. Of course, it could have simply been the misdeeds of some nihilistic teenage pranksters with too much time on their hands. But, in our cultural climate, with more and more antagonism being aimed at conservative Christians in the so-called "culture war," my money is on the hypothesis that the arsonist was someone with a chip on his shoulder, someone who has come to dispise evangelical Christians or "organized religion."
Whoever it was, let us pray that the police catch him (or them) soon, before they can do this again.
Race does not appear to be a factor since the churches set ablaze represented both black and white congregations. This suggests that the motive of the arsonist(s) could have been religious or perhaps political. Of course, it could have simply been the misdeeds of some nihilistic teenage pranksters with too much time on their hands. But, in our cultural climate, with more and more antagonism being aimed at conservative Christians in the so-called "culture war," my money is on the hypothesis that the arsonist was someone with a chip on his shoulder, someone who has come to dispise evangelical Christians or "organized religion."
Whoever it was, let us pray that the police catch him (or them) soon, before they can do this again.
Jan 17, 2006
We Need Judge Alito Now!
Once again, an activist, liberal-leaning, life-hating Supreme Court has made the wrong ruling! Today, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled to uphold the Oregon law that permits physician-assisted suicide. Both Justices O'Conner and Kennedy, purported to be conservatives, sided with majority to perpetuate the culture of death that has prevailed in that state for several years now.
This decision, of course, is just part of the trend that Americans have had to live with for many years--the trend to move our society further and further away from commonsense moral values and a respect for the sanctity of human life. In 1973, they legalized abortion on demand. A couple of years ago, the court struck down all the nation's anti-sodomy laws, paving the way for the possibility of same-sex marriage down the road. A few months ago, they undermined one of our most basic liberties, the right to private property, by allowing cities to use the concept of public domain to take people's homes and sell them to private corporations to enhance the local economy. In many of the more recent cases, Justice O'Conner has been the deciding vote in very close 5-4 decisions by the court.
Fortunately, she is about to retire. And, Lord willing, Judge Samuel Alito will take her place and swing the balance of the court back in the direction of sanity. We need him and others like him on the Supreme Court now! He and Judge Roberts are long overdue!
The one good thing that came out of the court's decision today is that we all got to see Judge Robert's true colors--he joined Scalia and Thomas in desenting from the court's life-hating decision to allow Oregon doctors to continue killing human beings.
This decision, of course, is just part of the trend that Americans have had to live with for many years--the trend to move our society further and further away from commonsense moral values and a respect for the sanctity of human life. In 1973, they legalized abortion on demand. A couple of years ago, the court struck down all the nation's anti-sodomy laws, paving the way for the possibility of same-sex marriage down the road. A few months ago, they undermined one of our most basic liberties, the right to private property, by allowing cities to use the concept of public domain to take people's homes and sell them to private corporations to enhance the local economy. In many of the more recent cases, Justice O'Conner has been the deciding vote in very close 5-4 decisions by the court.
Fortunately, she is about to retire. And, Lord willing, Judge Samuel Alito will take her place and swing the balance of the court back in the direction of sanity. We need him and others like him on the Supreme Court now! He and Judge Roberts are long overdue!
The one good thing that came out of the court's decision today is that we all got to see Judge Robert's true colors--he joined Scalia and Thomas in desenting from the court's life-hating decision to allow Oregon doctors to continue killing human beings.
Jan 3, 2006
Do You Know How to Interpret the Bible?
Everyone has an opinion of what particular passages of Scripture mean. Too often I hear things like "That's just your interpretation" or "This text means to me. . ."--as if there is no right interpretation of biblical texts and as if any interpretation is as good as another.
However, nothing could be further from the truth. Any biblical text means what its original author intended it to mean, nothing more, nothing less. What's more, we can learn that meaning if we are willing to work hard at it. There is a science of interpreting books, including the Bible. That science is called "hermeneutics." Those who sudy biblical hermeneutics learn the appropriate rules and procedures for interpreting the Bible so that they can give intelligent, informed answers when people ask them about the meaning of a passage of Scripture.
The first 2006 issue of ARC's magazine Areopagus Journal will be about hermeneutics. If you care about "rightly dividing the Word of God", then I strongly encourage you to purchase that issue and get a crash course in biblical interpretation. You can order it at:
www.arcapologetics.org
However, nothing could be further from the truth. Any biblical text means what its original author intended it to mean, nothing more, nothing less. What's more, we can learn that meaning if we are willing to work hard at it. There is a science of interpreting books, including the Bible. That science is called "hermeneutics." Those who sudy biblical hermeneutics learn the appropriate rules and procedures for interpreting the Bible so that they can give intelligent, informed answers when people ask them about the meaning of a passage of Scripture.
The first 2006 issue of ARC's magazine Areopagus Journal will be about hermeneutics. If you care about "rightly dividing the Word of God", then I strongly encourage you to purchase that issue and get a crash course in biblical interpretation. You can order it at:
www.arcapologetics.org
Debate on Intelligent Design
New Orleans Seminary is hosting a debate on Intelligent Design theory to be held in Marietta, Georgia at Johnson Ferry Road Baptist Church on Feb. 3-4, 2006.
The two main speakers are William Dembski, one of the premier defenders of ID, and Michael Ruse, a prominent critic of ID. Other participants include William Lane Craig, Frank Beckwith, Martin Hewlett, and Wesley Elsberry. Make plans to attend this important event.
The two main speakers are William Dembski, one of the premier defenders of ID, and Michael Ruse, a prominent critic of ID. Other participants include William Lane Craig, Frank Beckwith, Martin Hewlett, and Wesley Elsberry. Make plans to attend this important event.
Dec 20, 2005
A Third Option in Church/State Relations
No doubt you have noticed that around Christmas time the perennial debate over the relationship between church and state tends to heat up. Christians want to put up their Nativity scenes at the courthouse and the secularists want to stop them. Then the discussion goes round and round over the intent of the Founding fathers in the constitution's statements about religion and whether allowing a place for religious expression in the public square is tantamount to a government endorsement of religion.
The debate, it seems to me, is always polarized between two extremes, both of which were clearly seen in the recent Fox News Special on "Religion in America." On the one hand are the Separationists who believe that religion has no place whatsoever in the public square and that the government should keep religious expressions out of public facilities and meetings completely. On the other hand are the Majoritarians who believe that "majority rules" and that whatever religion happens to be in the majority should have access to the public square and a priviledge position in the culture at large. Majoritarians rightly think that separationism violates their right to the free exercise of religion. However, a case can be made that the majoritarian view really is tantamount to a government establish of religion. And so there is always the inevitble stand-off.
However, this stand-off could be greatly alleviated if both sides relaized that there is a third alternative. its an alternative that has traditionally been defended by Baptists, by the way--but most Baptists today have forgotten it. It is called Accommodationism. This is the view that the government should, as far as is practically possible, accommodate (not endorse) the free exercise of religion. In other words, to use just one example, the government should not set up Nativity scenes at the courthouse nor pay to have it done, but it should make public space available to private citizens to do so if they like. They should also make such space available to the Jews, Muslims, and atheists. The government should say to everyone, regardless of their religious views, "Ya'll come!"
Accommodationism provides for a free market of ideas. No one's rights are violated, and the government isn't establishing or endorsing any faith. This, it seems to me, is much closer to what our founding fathers intended.
The debate, it seems to me, is always polarized between two extremes, both of which were clearly seen in the recent Fox News Special on "Religion in America." On the one hand are the Separationists who believe that religion has no place whatsoever in the public square and that the government should keep religious expressions out of public facilities and meetings completely. On the other hand are the Majoritarians who believe that "majority rules" and that whatever religion happens to be in the majority should have access to the public square and a priviledge position in the culture at large. Majoritarians rightly think that separationism violates their right to the free exercise of religion. However, a case can be made that the majoritarian view really is tantamount to a government establish of religion. And so there is always the inevitble stand-off.
However, this stand-off could be greatly alleviated if both sides relaized that there is a third alternative. its an alternative that has traditionally been defended by Baptists, by the way--but most Baptists today have forgotten it. It is called Accommodationism. This is the view that the government should, as far as is practically possible, accommodate (not endorse) the free exercise of religion. In other words, to use just one example, the government should not set up Nativity scenes at the courthouse nor pay to have it done, but it should make public space available to private citizens to do so if they like. They should also make such space available to the Jews, Muslims, and atheists. The government should say to everyone, regardless of their religious views, "Ya'll come!"
Accommodationism provides for a free market of ideas. No one's rights are violated, and the government isn't establishing or endorsing any faith. This, it seems to me, is much closer to what our founding fathers intended.
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